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STRUCTURE VERSUS EFFECT: REVEALING
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL OPERATION
OF TITLE IX'S ATHLETICS PROVISIONS
Abstract: Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of sex in any educational program receiving
federal financial assistance, including athletics. Although the statute has
brought great improvements in female athletics, such achievements
have not come without problems. Title IX's complex regulatory frame-
work, developed by the Department of Education, has led to numerous
lawsuits. In early cases, courts interpreted and upheld the framework as
consistent with Title IX. This Note argues, however, that the courts'
early decisions and interpretation of the framework, coupled with
educational institutions' current fiscal constraints, have left institutions
with only one option for compliance: cutting men's teams. Such an
inflexible framework amounts to a gender-based quota system that,
under recent affirmative action caselaw, courts should hold uncon-
stitutional. Only then will the Department of Education have the
impetus to reinterpret the regulatory framework so that Title IX can
operate in the way in which it was originally intended.
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted Title IX as part of the Education Amendments
of 1972 in response to its finding of pervasive discrimination against
women with respect to educational opportunities) Title IX's objec-
tives are to prevent the use of federal funds to support discriminatory
practices and to provide individual citizens protection against those
practices.2 Despite its seemingly clear language, however, application
of Title IX has not come without problems. 3 Indeed, the complex
regulatory framework that the Department of Education (the "DOE")
Education Amendments of 1972, Pub, L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-905, 86 Stat. 235, 373-
75 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)); 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Bayb). The House Special Subcommittee on Education held extensive
hearings, during which over 1200 pages of testimony were gathered, documenting "mas-
sive, persistent patterns of discrimination against women" in colleges and universities. 118
CONG. REC. 5804 (1972).
2 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
3 See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 613-16 (6th Cir.
2002); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 864, 876-82 (5th Cir. 2000); Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 892-93 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Cohen I").
825
826	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol, 46:825
developed in an effort to clarify the statute's athletics provisions has
resulted in numerous lawsuits and the subsequent need for judicial
in terpre tation."
In 1993, in Cohen v. Brown University, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit heard the first challenge brought by a fe-
male under the Title IX athletics provisions. 5
 This case presented the
first opportunity for the federal court system to analyze and interpret
the complex regulatory framework that governs the enforcement of
Title IX.6
 The court's conclusions were pivotal because virtually every
federal circuit court of appeals that has subsequently ruled on a Title
IX athletics discrimination case has followed the First Circuit's analysis. 7
This deference to the Cohen court's analysis was justified initially
because most challenges under Title IX's athletics provisions were
characteristically similar to Cohen, in which female athletes were chal-
lenging a school action that had an adverse effect on their opportu-
nity to participate.8
 More recently, however, the characteristic chal-
lenge under Title IX's athletics provisions has changed, with the
challenge instead coming from male athletes. 9
 These athletes contend
that, under the current interpretation of Title IX's regulatory frame-
work, universities faced with mandatory budget cuts are left with only
one option for complying with Title IX: cutting men's teams." Be-
cause such decisions are based solely on gender, they violate Title IX
and the Fourteenth Amendment. 11
 Thus far, however, the courts have
approved these cuts as being consistent with the mandate of Title IX,
4 See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 613-16; Pederson, 213 F.3d at 864, 876-
82; Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 892-93.
5 Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 891.
6 Id.
7
 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 615; Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d
1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 2002); Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 1999); Boulaha-
nis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d
155, 172-73 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Cohen IF); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d
265, 271, 272-73, 275 (6th Cir. 1994); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824,
830 & n.9, 831-32 (10th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 171
(3rd Cir. 1993).
8 See, e.g., Pederson, 213 F.3d at 864; Horner, 43 F.3d at 268; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 826.
9 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 610; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Boulahanis,
198 F.3d at 635; Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1994); Nat'l Wrestling
Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (D.D.C. 2003), affil, 366 F.2d
930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2537 (2005).
10 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 610; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 267.
" See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 615; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 267.
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and at least one court has determined that these cuts do not offend
the Fourteenth Amendment." In reaching this conclusion, the courts
have continued to rely on the analysis of the First Circuit in Cohen. 15
This Note argues, however, that such continuing deference to the
First Circuit's analysis and reasoning in Cohen, in light of the sub-
stance of the recent male challenges to Title IX and the fiscal realities
in higher education, is improper, and it is time for the circuit courts
to alter their analysis of these claims." The courts today are faced with
a set of claims—those based on the consequences of the Cohen decision
in light of the reality of fiscal constraints—that are different from
those faced by the Cohen court, and, as such, it is proper for the courts
to reevaluate the original interpretation the First Circuit gave to Title
IX's regulatory framework.° Examination of how this original inter-
pretation has operated in practice since the 1993 decision reveals an
inherently inflexible structure that has resulted in decision making
based solely on gender. 1 ' This inflexibility, particularly when consid-
ered in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent 2003 affirmative ac-
tion rulings in Grunter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, should encour-
age the circuit courts to determine that the regulatory framework of
Title IX's athletics provisions is unconstitutional."
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the legislative history
of Title IX and the development of the regulatory framework that
governs the enforcement of its athletics provisions.° This Part then
discusses the first judicial interpretation of Title IX's athletics provi-
sions in Cohen, including the First Circuit's important analysis and
conclusions regarding the complex regulatory framework.° Although
virtually every circuit court has followed this analysis, this Part also
discusses two district court rulings that offer concerns about the First
12 Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043, 1048-99 (approving the elimination of men's wrestling);
Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269, 272-73 (approving the elimination of diving, fencing, and men's
swimming while retaining women's swimming); see Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at
611, 615-16 (approving the elimination of men's soccer, tennis, and wrestling).
23 E.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 771; Boulahanis, 198 F,3d at 639; Homer, 43 F.3d at 275; Roberts,
998 F.2d at 830 & n.9.
14 See infra notes 254-74 and accompanying text.
13 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 610, 615; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639; Kel-
ley, 35 F.3d at 267, 272.
16 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 269.
17 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
271-72 (2003).
18 See infra notes 29-55 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 56-91 and accompanying text.
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Circuit's approach. 2° Part II provides a discussion of the more recent
male challenges to Title IX's athletics provisions,21 It highlights the
realities of fiscal pressures on educational institutions and how the
resulting necessity for budget cuts, coupled with the Cohen court's in-
terpretation of Title IX's regulatory framewOrk, has forced institu-
tions to cut only men's teams. 22 In light of the nature of the male ath-
letes' claims, Part III suggests a correlation between the male Title IX
claims and the claims in affirmative action cases, and thus provides an
overview of the Supreme Court's current thought on the issue of
affirmative action programs in higher education. 23
Finally, Part IV critically analyzes the First Circuit's original inter-
pretation of Title IX's regulatory framework and rejects it as creating
a framework that is impermissibly inflexible under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Part IV.A explains the
various flaws in the First Circuit's reasoning in Cohen and concludes
that the court's deference to the DOE's original Policy Interpretation
of Title IX was inappropriate, and that its interpretation of prong
three of the DOE's three-part test and of the operation of the test as a
whole was flawed.25 Part IV.B then reveals that the First Circuit's in-
terpretation has in effect resulted in the elimination of any flexibility
the regulatory framework originally possessed. 26 Part IV.0 argues that
this lack of flexibility is directly at odds with the Supreme Court's cur-
rent affirmative action jurisprudence, which emphasizes the need for
flexibility when decisions are made based on an individual's member-
ship in a particular class. 27 Part IV.D, finally, summarizes the foregoing
analysis and suggests that the circuit courts alter their analyses of Title
IX claims and instead hold that the regulatory framework, as cur-
rently interpreted, is unconstitutional.28
26 See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 111-52 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 153-80 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 181-274 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 186-225 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
27
 See infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 254-74 and accompanying text.
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I. TITLE IX: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. Legislative History of Title IX
Before examining the problems with Title IX's regulatory frame-
work, it is first necessary to understand how this complex framework
came into being.29 Although the objective of the statute—to prevent
the use of federal funds to support discriminatory practices in educa-
tion—was clear, the language of the statute and the subsequent ambi-
guity in its application to athletics resulted in the development of a
complicated regulatory framework through which the statute is now
applied." The courts rely on this complex regulatory scheme to guide
their interpretation of Title IX's athletics provisions. 3 '
1. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
The language of the statute makes clear that Title IX prohibits
gender discrimination in educational programs or activities receiving
federal financial assistance." It provides, in relevant part in § 1681,
that no person shall be discriminated against on the basis of sex in
any federally funded education program or activity." Also in § 1681,
the statute specifically provides that statistical evidence of disparities
between genders in education programs and activities cannot alone
lead to a finding of discrimination. 34
" See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000); Cohen I, 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993).
30 See Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX
Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on Student Body
Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 845, 850-53 (1994).
31 See, e.g., Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 267-68, 270-72 (7th Cir. 1994); Cohen I,
991 F.2d at 893-900; Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dept of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d
82, 87-93 (D.D.C. 2003), affd, 366 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2537
(2005).
" 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a).
55 Id. The drafters modeled Title IX's general prohibition against sex discrimination
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
514 (1982). Title VI provides that "(nlo person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
54 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b). In particular, the statute states that
(n)othing contained in ... this section shall be interpreted to require any
educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or
receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in com-
830	 Boston College Law Review
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In connection with the passage of Title IX, Congress did not
produce any secondary legislative materials; there was no committee
report included with the bill.35
 This lack of legislative history, along
with no specific mention of athletics in the statute itself, rendered
ambiguous the application of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics." In
response to growing confusion over Title IX's application to intercol-
legiate athletics, Congress directed the DOE, through its Office of
Civil Rights ("OCR"), to develop a regulation implementing the pro-
visions of Title IX, including specific provisions for intercollegiate ath-
letics." Pursuant to this directive, the DOE promulgated a Final Regu-
lation (the "Regulation") in 1975, which remains in effect."
The Regulation mirrors Title IX's language by generally prohibit-
ing discrimination of student-athletes based on sex. 39
 In addition to
this general provision, the Regulation addresses federally funded ath-
letics programs and provides that a recipient of federal funds shall
provide equal athletic opportunities for members of both sexes. 40 The
Regulation then lists ten factors to be used to assess equivalence be-
tween male and female athletic opportunities.'" Factor one involves a
consideration as to whether the selection of sports and levels of com-
parison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any
community, State, section, or other area.
Id.
33 Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 893; Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 850 & n.17.
36 Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 850. Congressional records indicate that in-
tercollegiate athletics were only mentioned twice during the congressional debate on the
statute. 118 CONE. REc. 5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh on privacy in athletic facili-
ties); 117 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh noting that the proposed
Title IX would not require mixed-gender football teams).
57
 Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 844 (1974).
Agency responsibility for the administration of Title IX shifted from the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW') to the DOE when HEW was split into two agen-
cies, the DOE and the Department of Health and Human Services. See Pub. L. No. 96-88,
93 Stat. 668 (1979). The regulations and the agency documents discussed in this Note were
originally promulgated by HEW, the administering agency at the time, and later adopted
by the present administrative agency, the DOE. See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895. For the sake of
simplicity, this Note will treat the DOE as the promulgating agency.
" 34 C.F.R. § 106.1—.71 (2004). The promulgation of the Final Regulation followed a
four-month period in which the DOE received and considered over 9700 comments, sug-
gestions, and objections to the proposed regulation. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Sex in Education Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial
Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,127, 24,128 ( June 4, 1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.1—.71
(2004)) thereinafter "Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex'].
33 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a).
" 34 CER, § 106.41(c).
41 Id.
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petition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of both
sexes; factors two through ten consider equivalence in the provision
of other services, facilities, and resources. 42
2. The DOE's 1979 Policy Interpretation
After the DOE issued the Regulation, however, confusion followed
as to how properly to apply the ten factors and otherwise comply with
Tide IX.° As a result, the agency in 1979 issued a Policy Interpretation,
which contains three separate sections." Section one clarifies the stat-
ute's application with respect to scholarships; section two discusses the
use of factors two through ten of the ten-factor test; and the third sec-
tion sets forth an interpretation of factor one—whether the institution
effectively accommodates the interests and abilities of both sexes. 45
Under this third section, the DOE provides that institutions may
use "any non-discriminatory" method to assess students' athletic inter-
ests and abilities, and further offers guidance as to appropriate mecha-
nisms for assessing such interest. 46 This section then sets forth a three-
part test to determine if the institution is effectively accommodating
the interests and abilities of both male and female athletes: (1) whether
42 Id. Specifically, factors two through ten were as follows:
(2) [t]he provision of equipment and supplies; (3) [s]cheduling of games
and practice time; (4) [t] ravel and per diem allowance; (5) [o]pportunity to
receive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) [a]ssignment and compensation
of coaches and tutors; (7) [plrovision of locker rooms, practice and competi-
tive facilities; (8) Ipirovision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) [p]rovision of housing and dining facilities and services; (10) [IA ublicity.
Id. The OCR stated that this list was intended to serve as guidance on what factors the
DOE considered integral to providing equal athletic opportunities. Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Sex, supra note 38, at 24,134. The enumerated items were not intended to be
an exhaustive list. See id.
45 See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,413, 71,413 (Dec, 11, 1979) [hereinafter "Policy Interpretation"]. By November
1978, the DOE had received almost one hundred complaints alleging that more than sixty-
two colleges and universities were violating Tide IX by not providing women equal oppor-
tunities in athletics. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070, 58,071 (Dec. 11, 1978).
44 Policy Interpretation, supra note 43, at 71,413-14.
45 Id. at 71,414.
46 Id. at 71,417. The Policy Interpretation requires that this nondiscriminatory method
take into account the nationally increasing levels of women's interests and abilities, that
the method of determining interest not disadvantage the members of the underrepre-
sented sex, that the method of determining ability take into account team performance
records, and that the methods used generally be responsive to the expressed interests of
students of the underrepresented sex who are capable of participating in intercollegiate
competition. Id.
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participation opportunities are provided in numbers "substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments," (2) "whether the insti-
tution can show a history and continuing practice of program expan-
sion," and (3) whether the interests and abilities of the members of the
underrepresented sex have been fully and effectively accommodated. 47
Proper interpretation and application of this three-part test has been
the subject of most, if not all, of the Title IX athletics litigation."
3. The DOE's 1996 Policy Clarification
Guided by the Policy Interpretation, universities continued to at-
tempt to comply with Title IX, but these attempts at compliance cre-
ated a new set of concerns among institutions, athletes, and members
of Congress." In June 1995, after holding a hearing on Title IX and the
three-part test outlined above, 142 members of Congress wrote to the
DOE expressing concern over the fact that educational institutions
were satisfying prong one of the three-part test—substantial propor-
tionality of opportunity—by eliminating men's athletic opportunities."
In response to this request for more guidance about the existing stan-
dards governing the enforcement of Title IX, the DOE in 1996 issued a
Policy Clarification. 51
The Policy Clarification provides specific factors intended to
guide an analysis under each part of the three-part test and includes
examples to demonstrate how these factors should be analyzed in
practice.52
 It underscores the fact that the requirement addressed by
the three-part test—the effective accommodation of interests and
abilities of both sexes—is only one of many factors considered under
the Regulation to determine if an institution is in compliance with
41 Id. at 71,418.
48 See, e.g., Kelley, 35 F.3d at 267-68, 270-72; Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 893-900.
49 See Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 92.
5° Id,
51
 Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/docs/clarific.html [hereinafter "Policy Clarification"]. Prior to issuing this Policy
Clarification, the DOE solicited public comment with respect to the narrow question of
whether the Policy Clarification provided the appropriate clarity to areas of the three-part
test that had generated questions. Dear Colleague Letter from Norma V. Cantil, Assistant
Sec'y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Jan. 16, 1996), http://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html [hereinafter "Dear Colleague Letterl. The
DOE received and considered over 200 public comments prior to the issuance of the final
Policy Clarification in January 1996. Id.
52
 Policy Clarification, supra note 51.
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Title IX. 53 Further, the letter accompanying the Policy Clarification
describes the first prong as a "safe harbor" for establishing compli-
ance with the equal opportunity requirement." Finally, the Policy
Clarification emphasizes that the three-part test provides an institu-
tion with three different avenues of compliance, that institutions have
flexibility in deciding how to provide nondiscriminatory participation
opportunities for their students, and that the OCR does not require
quotas. 55
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Title IX Athletics Provisions
Courts must rely on this complex regulatory framework for guid-
ance when deciding athletes' Title IX challenges against universities."
The common challenge to the athletics provisions of Title IX involves
women, as the underrepresented sex, challenging some school action
that has an adverse effect on their opportunity to participate.57 Typi-
cally, the challenged action involves either the downgrading of women's
teams from varsity to club status (with its corresponding loss of funding,
respect, and ability to attract talented athletes and coaches), the drop-
ping of women's teams altogether, or the refusal to upgrade women's
club teams to varsity status. 58 In the face of such a claim of discrimina-
tion under Tide IX, institutions typically defend themselves by chal-
lenging the validity of the Regulation and the Policy Interpretation—
especially the three-part test. 59 In particular, schools often argue that
the Policy Interpretation and its three-part test are inconsistent with
Title IX, exceed agency authority, and violate the Equal Protection
Clause because they operate to discriminate against men, the overrep-
resented sex." Much to the dismay of the institutions, however, Title
53 Id. The letter was likely alluding to factors two through ten of the Regulation. See id.
"Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 51.
55 Policy Clarification, supra note 51. In arguing that the three-part test does not oper-
ate as a quota, the letter emphasizes the flexibility that the test affords, such that if insti-
tution decides to comply with the effective accommodations test by satisfying prong three,
it would not be required to achieve substantial proportionality or show a history of contin-
ued expansion of opportunities for the underrepresented sex. Id.
58 See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 610-13 (6th Cir.
2002); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270; Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 893-94.
57 See e.g., Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 864 (5th Cir. 2000); Horner v. Ky.
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 1994); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Ag-
ric., 998 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 892-93.
58 See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 826; Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1993);
Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 892; Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 868.
59 Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
60 Id.
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IX, its Regulation, and the Policy Interpretation thus far have survived
constitutional challenges in the federal circuit courts of appeals. 61 The
courts have chosen to give substantial deference to the Regulation and
the Policy Interpretation as valid mechanisms for the enforcement of
Title 1X.62
This consistent and substantial deference to the Regulation and
the Policy Interpretation results from the almost universal reliance on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's analysis in the 1993
watershed case, Cohen v. Brown University. 63 Indeed, virtually every cir-
cuit court that has subsequently ruled on a Title IX discrimination in
athletics case has followed the First Circuit's analysis of and level of
deference to the Regulation and the Policy Interpretation. 64
1. Cohen v. Brown University The "Watershed" Interpretation
In 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit became the
first federal court of appeals to rule on a case involving the athletics
provisions of Tide IX in the case Cohen v. Brown University ("Cohen. /1.66
In that case, the plaintiffs, representing a class of current and future
women athletes, challenged Brown University's decision to drop
women's volleyball and gymnastics from intercollegiate varsity status,
which Brown had undertaken in an effort to reduce its financial bur-
den.66 The plaintiffs alleged that Brown violated Title IX's ban on gen-
der-based discrimination in its provision of athletics.° They further ar-
61
 Sec Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 613-16; Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291
F.3d 1042, 1047-50 (8th Cir. 2002); Pederson, 213 F.3d at 878-82; Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198
F.3d 763, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1999); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 637-39 (7th
Cir. 1999); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271-72; Cook, 992 F.2d at 18; Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895-900, 905-
06.
62 See cg., Neal, 198 F.3d at 771-73; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828; Cohen
I, 991 F.2d at 899.
Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 891; see Julia Lamber, Gender and Intercollegiate Athletics: Data and
Myths, 34 U. Wm. J. L. REFORM 151, 169 (2000).
64 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 615; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1047; Neal, 198
F.3d at 767; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638; Cohen II, 101 F.3d 155, 172-73 (1st Cir. 1996); Hor-
ner, 43 F.3d at 271, 272-73, 275; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 & n.9, 831-32; Williams v. Sch. Dist.
of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cu. 1993); Lamber, supra note 63, at 169.
65 See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 891, 907. The First Circuit numbers its Cohen cases in a dif-
ferent manner from this Note, but because this Note is only discussing two opinions, it
refers to the First Circuit's initial opinion as Cohen I and the First Circuit's opinion after
remand to the district court as Cohen II.
66 Id. at 892. As part of this plan, Brown also dropped men's golf and men's water polo
from varsity status. Id.
67 Id. at 893. Although the elimination of these four teams did not significantly impact
the overall participation rate of either gender, the existing participation rates did not rep-
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gued that Brown's decision to devalue two women's programs without
first taking steps to equalize the athletic opportunities, either by reduc-
ing men's activities or by adding other women's teams to compensate
for the loss, further exacerbated this violation."
After engaging in an overview of the legislative and regulatory
history of Title IX, the First Circuit held that the DOE's Title IX Regu-
lation should be accorded appreciable deference.69 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Reserve
Defense Council, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision address-
ing the issue of judicial deference to administrative agency determina-
tions." The court granted the Regulation particularly high deference
because Congress had explicitly delegated to the agency the responsi-
bility of setting forth Title IX standards for athletic programs: 7 i The
court then went on to hold that the Policy Interpretation should also
be given substantial deference, as it was a reasonable interpretation of
the Regulation."
Having granted deference to the Policy Interpretation, the court
then reviewed each of the three sections of the Policy Interpreta-
tion—athletic financial assistance, equivalence of other program ar-
eas, and effective accommodation of student interests and abilities."
The court concluded that an institution can violate Title IX even if it
complies with the first two sections. 74 In other words, under this in-
terpretation, an institution must comply with the third section and its
three-part test to prevail in a Title IX challenge."
The court reviewed the three-part test and accepted the state-
ment in the Policy Clarification that the first benchmark provides a
safe harbor for institutions to achieve compliance." The court then
resent statistical equality with the student population. Id. at 892. Both before and after the
cuts, women had approximately 37% of the athletic opportunities and men about 63%,
compared to Brown's student body population of approximately 52% men and 48%
women. Id.
68 Id. at 893.
6° Id. at 893-95.
7° Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984)).
71 Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (holding that where Congress has explicitly dele-
gated responsibility to an agency, the agency's regulations deserve "controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute" at issue)).
72 Id. at 896-97.
75 Id. at 897.
74 Id,
76 See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 897.
76 Id.
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went on to describe that the second and third parts of the test provide
additional means for achieving compliance; indeed, the court recog-
nized that it was unlikely that athletic establishments at most institu-
tions would reflect the gender balance of their student bodies. 77 The
court cautioned, however, that the third part of the test sets a high
standard in that it requires full and effective accommodation, and
that if there is sufficient interest and ability among members of the
underrepresented sex that existing programs do not satisfy, an institu-
tion necessarily fails the third prong of the test."
In reaching its holding on the proper application of the third
part of the effective accommodation test, the court rejected Brown's
argument that, to the extent that students' interests in athletics are
disproportionate by gender, the third part of the test should be read
to allow institutions to meet the interests of students incompletely, so
long as the school's response is in direct proportion to the compara-
tive levels of interest." In the court's opinion, Brown's interpretation
"read[] the 'full' out of the duty to accommodate 'fully and effec-
tively.'"° Additionally, the court held that Brown's view, which would
have required the assessment of relative interests and abilities of the
student population, would have made it overly difficult for institutions
to assess compliance and would have presented significant and
difficult quantification problems. 8' Rather, the court preferred a sim-
pler and easier-to-administer interpretation of prong three, which re-
quires an academic institution to establish a new team or upgrade an
existing club team if there is a sufficiently high unmet need in the
underrepresented gender. 82 Thus, the court adopted this high stan-
dard primarily based on its ease of administration and not necessarily
because of its consistency with agency intent.°
77 Id. at 897-98.
" Id. at 898.
" Id. at 899-900. The court provided an example of Brown's reasoning: suppose a
university, "Oooh U.", has a student body consisting of 1000 men, 500 of whom are inter-
ested and able to compete, and 1000 women, 250 of whom are interested and able to
compete. Id. at 899. Under Brown's reasoning, Oooh U. would have had to provide ath-
letic opportunities in line with the two-to-one interested athletes ratio—here, 100 slots for
men and fifty slots for women. Id.
ai Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 899 (quoting Policy Interpretation, supra note 43, at 71,418).
Continuing its hypothetical, the court held that to satisfy prong three, Oooh U. would
have had to accommodate the interests of all 250 women. Id.
91 Id, at 900.
82 Id.
a' See id.
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Having reached the above conclusions, the First Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court for further proceedings on
whether Brown had violated Title IX. 84 On remand, the district court
applied the test laid out in Cohen I and determined that Brown's ath-
letic programs violated Title IX. 89 Brown then appealed the decision,
challenging on constitutional and statutory grounds the test em-
ployed by the district court. 88
In upholding the district court's findings after remand, the First
Circuit, in Cohen II, upheld the Cohen I analysis and conclusions. 87 The
court also addressed the claim that its Cohen I test for compliance with
Title IX effectively renders Title IX an "affirmative action statute" that
results in preferential treatment for women because it imposes quotas
that exceed women's relative interests and abilities in athletics. 88 In
rejecting this claim, the court maintained that Title IX is not an
affirmative action statute, but rather an anti-discrimination statute,
and that no aspect of the Title IX regime mandates gender-based
preferences or quotas. 89 Indeed, the court pointed out that the sub-
stantial proportionality prong of the three-part test is merely a starting
point for the analysis, and that it is but one aspect of the inquiry into
whether an institution's athletics program complies with Title IX." In
coming to this conclusion, however, the court failed to consider the
fact that its interpretation of prong three had effectively left prong
one as the only mechanism for a financially strapped institution to
achieve compliance.91
2. District Court Concerns with Cohen Deference and Interpretation
Although most courts have followed the analysis and interpreta-
tion of the First Circuit in Cohen I and Cohen II not all have done so
without reservation. 92 Indeed, several federal district courts have
84 Id. at 907.
85 Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 161.
86 1d. at 162.
87 Id. at 172-73.
88 Id. at 169.
89
 Id. at 170.
90 Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 171.
91 See id. at 170-71. But see Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 613 (recognizing that
In the real world of finite resources, [cutting men's teams] may be the only way for an
education institution to comply with Title IX").
92 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs., No. CV-F-97-5009 REC., 1999 WL 1569047, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
1999) ("Neal District"), rev d, 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912
F. Supp. 892, 913-14 (M.D. La. 1996) ("Pederson District"), rev d, 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir.
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called into question the substantial deference granted to the Policy
Interpretation, as well as the use of proportionality (prong one of the
three-part test) as a measure of compliance. 93
 These concerns repre-
sent valid issues with the current interpretation of Title IX and its
regulatory framework. 94
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana ar-
ticulated the most explicit rejection of the First Circuit's analysis and
interpretation in its 1996 decision, Pederson v. Louisiana State Univer-
sity.95
 In that case, the court pointed out that no President has ever
approved the Policy Interpretation, and thus it does not have the
binding effect that would normally be accorded to such rules and
regulations.9° Further, and more importantly, the court held that
prong one of the three-part test—substantial proportionality—should
not be considered a "safe harbor" because stopping the inquiry at the
point of numerical equality would not comport with Title 1X's man-
date.97
 The court held that although the Policy Interpretation serves
as a useful guide, to the extent that it suggests that numerical propor-
tionality between the sexes will suffice, it is contrary to the language
of Title IX and should not be followed.98
Two additional district courts have expressed reservations about
the Policy Interpretation's proportionality test." In the 1994 case Kel-
ley v. Board of Trustees, in which the plaintiffs—male swimmers—sought
a preliminary injunction to prevent the university from cutting their
program while leaving the female swimming program intact, the U. S.
District Court for the Central District of Illinois expressed some con-
2000); Kelley v. Ed. of Trs., 832 F. Supp. 237, 243-44 (C.D. III. 1993) ("Kelley District"),
rev 'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
" See Neal District, 1999 WL 1569047, at *3; Pederson District, 912 F. Supp. at 910, 913-
14; Kelley District, 832 F. Supp. at 241-43.
94
 See Neal District, 1999 WL 1569047, at *3; Pederson District, 912 F. Supp. at 910, 913—
14; Kelley District, 832 F. Supp. at 241-43.
See912 F. Supp. at 913-14.
96 /d. at 910.
97 Id. at 913-14. The court pointed out that the assumption underlying the substantial
proportionality test is that the interest and ability to participate in sports is equal between
all men and women on all campuses. Id. at 913. The court stated, however, that no basis
exists for such a pivotal assumption. Id. Rather, the court believed it more likely that inter-
ests and abilities will vary from campus to campus. Id. at 914. The court further pointed
out that the Cohen court (and others) reached the conclusion that the first prong should
be a "safe harbor" solely as a result of administrative deference. Id.
98 Id. at 914. The court went on to hold that because the university had failed to satisfy
prongs two and three of the three-part test, it was in violation of Title IX, regardless of the
court's holding on the validity of prong one. Id. at 915-17.
99 See Neal District, 1999 WL 1569047, at *3; Kelky District, 832 F. Supp. at 241.
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cern that the judicial and policy interpretations had essentially "con-
verted Title IX from a statute which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex ... into a statute which provides 'equal opportunity for
members of both sexes."'" The court also explicitly recognized that
the law could have been interpreted differently and that Congress
probably did not anticipate that Title IX would produce such "draco-
nian" results whereby men's teams are eliminated to achieve Title IX
compliance."'
With a similar line of reasoning, in 1999 in Neal v. Board of Trus-
tees, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
granted a preliminary injunction to male wrestlers who asserted Title
IX claims.'" In issuing the preliminary injunction in favor of the male
athletes, the court concluded that relying on proportionality to
achieve compliance constituted an implementation of a quota based
on gender, and that such a gender-based distinction was a violation of
Title IX. 1433 Although the Ninth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals rejected each of these expressed district court concerns, such
concerns reveal the lack of unanimous support for the Cohen court's
interpretation of the regulatory framework.'"
3. Christensen v. Harris County: A Revised View on Deference Due to
Agency Interpretations
In addition to the district courts' concerns with the Cohen court's
interpretation, a recent U.S. Supreme Court case also calls into ques-
tion the deference that the Cohen court granted to the Policy Interpre-
tation. 105 In holding that the Policy Interpretation should be granted
substantial deference, the Cohen court relied primarily upon Chev-
ron.'" In 2000, however, the Supreme Court, in Christensen v. Harris
County, clarified Chevron's applicability to agency interpretations other
than regulations. 107 In particular, the Court held that agency interpre-
10° 832 F. Supp. at 241.
101 Id. at 242, 243, Despite these concerns, the court held in favor of the university and
upheld the cuts to the men's swimming program, reasoning they were consistent with cur-
rent judicial and agency interpretation of Tide IX. Id. at 242, 244.
In 1999 WL 1569047, at *1, *3.
I" Id. at *S.
1" See id.; Pederson District, 912 F. Supp. at 913-14; Kelley District, 832 F. Supp. at 293-49.
'in See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); Neal District, 1999 WL
1569047, at *3; Pederson District, 912 F. Supp. at 913-14; Kelley District, 832 F. Supp. at 243—
49.
1°s
	 I, 991 F.2d at 895 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
107 Sec Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
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tations such as those in policy statements, opinion letters, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines—all of which do not have the
force of law—are not entitled to Chevron-style deference." The Court
stated that such interpretations are entitled to respect only to the ex-
tent that they are persuasive." Because the Cohen court acted four
years before Christensen, the First Circuit lacked Chnstensen's guidance
when it accorded substantial deference to the Policy Interpretation. 110
II, RECENT CHALLENGES TO TITLE IX: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MEN
In contrast to the typical early challenges to Title IX brought by
female athletes, currently the more frequent challenges to the statute
come from male athletes, who contend that the actions educational
institutions undertake in an effort to comply with Title IX in fact vio-
late Title IX and equal protection principles by impermissibly dis-
criminating against men."' Thus, in trying to avoid one type of law-
suit—a claim of a violation of Title IX because of the elimination of
women's teams—educational institutions instead are finding them-
selves in another uncertain legal position: that of defending the
elimination of men's teams to achieve compliance. 112
The practice of cutting teams has become prevalent because in-
tercollegiate athletic departments are facing ever-increasing financial
pressure to reduce budgets. 113 In making the required cuts, however,
institutions run the risk of violating Title IX if such cuts reduce the
opportunities for women at an institution that does not maintain sub-
stantial proportionality between its female student-athletes and its fe-
male student population.'" The Cohen court's initial judicial and
statutory interpretation has resulted in a situation where an institu-
tion that must impose budget cuts by cutting teams must comply with
108 Id,
1011 Id.
WI See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895 (giving the interpretation Chevron-style deference). See
infra notes 189-206 for a discussion of how the Supreme Court's ruling in Christensen
might have altered the Cohen court's analysis.
1 " See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 2002);
Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 2002); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Re-
gents, 198 F.3d 633, 635 (7th Cir. 1999); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir.
1994); Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (D.D.C.
2003), affil 366 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2537 (2005).
112 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 E3d at 610; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Boulaha-
nis, 198 F,3d at 635; Kelley, 35 F.2d at 267.
113 See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611; Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3r1 763,
765 (9th Cir. 1999); Kelley, 35 F.2d at 269.
114 see Atfity, 35 E3d at 269-70; Cohen I, 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993).
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prong one or be deemed in violation of Title IX. 115 As a result of this
difficulty in compliance, female athletes largely have been successful
in suing institutions when their programs are cut and getting their
respective athletic programs reinstated.no This trend in case law and
Title TX interpretation, coupled with the intense pressures to reduce
athletic budgets, has caused institutions to resort to cutting only
men's teams in order to remain compliant with Title IX. 117
Thus far, the courts have approved these cuts as being consistent
with the mandate of Title IX, 118 The courts have held that a university
may bring itself into compliance with Title IX either by increasing
opportunities for the underrepresented gender or by decreasing ath-
letic opportunities for the overrepresented gender.u 9 In coming to
115
 See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895-900. A school complies with prong two of the three-part
test if it "can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is de-
monstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of [the underrepresented]
sex." Policy Interpretation, supra note 43, at 71,418. Thus, an institution that cuts women's
teams will have great difficulty in complying with prong two. See Connolly & Adelman,
supra note 30, at 874. Similarly, an institution that makes cuts to women's teams will also
fail prong three because courts reason that if a women's team has been cut, the interests of
those team members are not being met, which means the interests of all female athletes as
a whole are not being "fully" met. See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 898-900. Thus, schools faced with
necessary budget cuts are forced to comply with prong one, substantial proportionality, or
cut only men's teams. Sec Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 846.
116 See Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830, 835 (10th Cir. 1993);
Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895-900, 907.
117 E.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611 (university eliminated men's soccer,
tennis, and wrestling teams after concluding it was not in compliance with Title IX and it
did not have funds to increase women's opportunities); Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 635 (uni-
versity eliminated men's soccer and wrestling teams after recognizing it was not in compli-
ance with Title IX and was unable to meet the interests and abilities of females); Kelley, 35
F.3d at 269 (university eliminated men's swimming in light of budget constraints and its
failure to comply with Title IX).
"8 Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043, 1048 (approving the elimination of men's wrestling);
Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272-73 (approving the elimination of men's swimming while retaining
women's swimming); see Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611, 615-16 (approving the
elimination of men's soccer, tennis, and wrestling).
119 Neal, 198 F.3d at 771 ("[A] n institution ... can bring itself into Title IX compliance
by reducing sufficiently the number of roster spots available to men."); Boulahanis, 198
F.3d at 638 ("[T] he elimination of men's athletic programs is not a violation of Title IX as
long as men's participation in athletics continues to be 'substantially proportionate' to
their enrollment."); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir.
1994) ("An institution need not pour ever-increasing sums into its athletic programs in
order to bring itself into compliance, but has the option of reducing opportunities for the
overrepresented gender while keeping opportunities for the underrepresented gender
stable."); Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 ("Financially strapped institutions may still comply with
Title IX by cutting athletic programs such that men's and women's athletic participation
rates become substantially proportionate to their representation in the undergraduate
population."); Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 898-99 n.15 ("[A university] can ... bring itself into
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this conclusion, each court again relied upon the analysis of the First
Circuit in Cohen I and its interpretation of the Regulation and Policy
In terpreta don . 120
A. The First Claim: Cutting Men's Teams Is a Violation of Title IX
In an attempt to fight the elimination of their respective programs,
male athletes first have attempted to claim that the elimination of their
teams, motivated by a concern for achieving gender parity under Title
IX, is itself a clear example of sex discrimination, which Title IX and its
implementing regulations expressly forbid. 121
 In particular, male ath-
letes argue that by eliminating their programs because of the sex of the
participants, the institutions are discriminating against the male ath-
letes on the basis of their sex, excluding them from participation in
educational programs because of their sex, and denying them the
benefits of educational programs because of their sex, all in violation of
Title IX. 122
 Additionally, male athletes argue that allowing universities
to make such cuts on the basis of sex, in an attempt to equalize the
rates of participation and allocation of resources, is analogous to im-
plementing a quota system based on sex. 125
 Such a quota system, they
argue, is also contrary to Title IX's purpose of encouraging, rather than
reducing, athletic opportunities for all students." 4
Thus far, these arguments by male athletes have never succeeded
in court. 125
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard
the first of these male athlete challenges to Title IX in 1994 in Kelley v.
Board of Trustees. 126
 In that case, the University of Illinois chose to drop
its men's swimming team in response to budget constraints and in
light of the university's failure to comply with Tide IX."' In response
compliance [with Title IX] ... by reducing opportunities for the overrepresented gender
while keeping opportunities stable for the underrepresented gender (or reducing them to
a much lesser extent).').
12° See Neal, 198 F.3d at 770-72; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639; Horner, 43 F.3d at 275; Rob-
erts, 998 F.2d at 830 & n.9.
121
 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 610; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Boulaha-
nis, 198 F.3d at 635.
122
 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 610.
125 See Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043.
124 See id.
' 25
 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 614-16; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272-73.
126 35 F.3d at 267. The court was presented with an appeal from a district court's grant-
ing of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id.
127 Id. at 269. In 1982, the DOE's OCR determined that the University of Illinois was
not in compliance with Title IX, but it granted the institution time to remedy the situation.
Id. Ten years later, however, female participation in athletics at the institution was still dis-
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to this action, male swimmers at the institution filed a complaint alleg-
ing that the school had violated Title IX by choosing to cut the men's
swimming program. 125
In holding that the institution had not violated Title IX by cut-
ting the men's program, the circuit court agreed with the Cohen court
both that the Regulation and the Policy Interpretation were a reason-
able interpretation of the statute and that deference should be ac-
corded to the agency's interpretations."9 Thus, the court concluded,
the institution did not violate Title IX when it acted in accordance
with the Regulation and the Policy Interpretation.'" The court also
made clear that if the institution had cut women's programs as part of
the cost-cutting measure, the action would have violated Title IX."'
Finally, in response to the argument that the proportionality test op-
erates as an impermissible quota, the court held that the three-part
test offered a flexible means for the university to achieve compliance,
and thus a school is not forced to meet the substantial proportionality
requiremen
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reached a similar
result in 2002 in Miami University Wrestling Club v. Miami University.m
In 1994, in light of disparities in program offerings for men and
women and the lack of additional funds to increase opportunities for
female students, Miami University determined that it had to eliminate
some male athletic opportunities to achieve compliance with Title
IX.'" It thus chose to eliminate the men's soccer, tennis, and wres-
tling teams."5 Male athletes filed suit against Miami University, argu-
ing the decision to cut their teams violated Title 1X. 136
The Sixth Circuit rejected the male athletes' Title IX claims.'"
The court held that the Policy Interpretation merited substantial def-
proportionate to female enrollment, with 23.4% female athletes versus a 44% female stu-
dent body. Id. Thus, when faced with budget cuts, the institution opted to cut men's teams
to protect itself from Title IX litigation. Id.
128 Id. at 267.
133
 Id. at 270.
1 " Id. at 271-72.
131 See Kelley. 35 F.3d at 269-70.
"2
 Sec id. at 271.
m 302 F.3d at 615-16.
134 Id. at 611.
133 Id.
136 Id. at 609-10.
17 Id. at 615-16.
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erence. 138 Additionally, the court agreed with the holdings in Cohen I
and Neal that Title IX was intended to protect women—the histori-
cally underrepresented gender. 139
B. The Second Claim: Cutting Men's Teams Is a Violation of Equal Protection
In addition to the Title IX claim, the second of the male athletes'
key claims is that an institution's action in eliminating men's but not
women's teams creates an illegal gender classification that violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 140 To violate
the Equal Protection Clause, a state actor—such as a public univer-
sity—must intentionally classify similarly situated individuals for dif-
ferent treatment based on some impermissible characteristic, such as
race, national origin, or gender."' Gender classifications are subject
to an "intermediate" standard of scrutiny, which requires any dis-
crimination based on sex to be substantially related to an important
government objective. 142 Thus, under this test, the court must deter-
mine, first, whether the government's objective is legitimate and im-
portant, and, second, whether a direct, substantial relationship exists
between the objective and the gender-based means of achieving it. 143
In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one
sex can be justified, but only if it intentionally and directly assists
members of the underrepresented sex.'" Male athletes frequently
argue that the elimination of men's teams because of their gender
does not satisfy this intermediate scrutiny standard because such ac-
tions are not substantially related to the purported goal of Title IX. 145
The most recent, and thus far the strongest equal protection
challenge to Title IX's regulatory framework, came in 2003 when the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia heard Na-
13a See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 615. The court rejected the plaintiffs
contention that the Policy Interpretation was controlled by the less deferential Christensen
standard rather than the Chevron standard. See id. (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 844). In particular, the Sixth Circuit thought that the Policy Interpretation
was far different from the opinion letter involved in Christensen, and that because neither
the regulations nor the Policy Interpretation were unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to Title IX, deference was warranted. See id.
129 See id. at 615 (citing Neal~ 198 F.3d at 770; Cohen II, 101 F.3d 155, 174 (1st Cir. 1996).
140 See id. at 610; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272.
141 Charles P. Beveridge, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: When Schools Cut Men's
Athletic Teams, 1996 U.	 L. REv. 809, 813.
142 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
143 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
144
 See id. at 728.
145 Sec Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272.
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tional Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Department of Education.' In this
case, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
to prevent the DOE from enforcing Title IX in a manner that dis-
criminates against male athletes. 147 In particular, the plaintiffs directly
challenged the Policy Interpretation and Policy Clarification, claiming
that these policy statements force schools to eliminate men's teams,
artificially limit the size of men's teams, and otherwise discriminate
against male athletes based on sex, thereby denying them equal pro-
tection under the law. 148
Despite the district court's ultimate holding that the plaintiffs
lacked standing, the court did suggest in its opinion that a challenge
like this one may have merit.'" Throughout the court's lengthy dis-
cussion of the legislative history and judicial interpretation of Title IX
and its regulatory framework, the court acknowledged that the policy
statements may not have been universally accepted as reasonable in-
terpretations of the statute and the Regulation.'" Further, the court
emphasized that the holding that these plaintiffs lacked standing did
not mean that the DOE actions were beyond the reach of judicial re-
view and that other potential avenues existed by which individuals or
institutions could challenge the regulatory framework. 151 Thus, de-
146 263 F. Supp. 2d at 85. This challenge represented the first direct challenge of the
validity of the Policy Interpretation and the Policy Clarification by way of an action
brought against the DOE. Id. at 97.
iv Id, at 85.
148
149 Id. at 124-25. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed
to meet the burden of pleading causation and redressability. Id. at 111. With respect to
causation, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the three-part test repre-
sented a "substantial factor" in the institutions' decision making. Id. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court emphasized that flexibility was key to the operation of Title IX and that
it could not be shown that the three-part test and the 1996 Clarification so controlled the
conduct of the institutions so as to confer standing on the plaintiffs. Id. at 114. With re-
spect to redressability, the court held that it could not be shown that any direct action by
the DOE in making new rules would force educational institutions to redress the plaintiffs
alleged injuries. Id. at 115.
166 See id. at 87-97. The court noted that the 1996 Clarification was drafted in response
to concerns by members of Congress that schools were cutting men's teams to reach sub-
stantial proportionality. Id. at 92. Additionally, the court addressed the fact that, prior to
issuing the 1996 Clarification, the DOE received comments suggesting that the proposed
Clarification and the three-part test it addressed were seriously flawed. Id.
161 Sec Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n, 263 F. Stipp. 2d at 125. For example, the court
stated that regulated agencies, such as the plaintiff's educational institution members,
have standing to challenge the DOE's Regulation and subsequent interpretations. Id. Fur-
thermore, an institution denied funding as a result of Title IX violation could challenge
the agency's authority, under Title IX, to adopt the policy interpretations at issue here. Id.
Individual plaintiffs additionally have an implied right of action under Title IX to chal-
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spite dismissing the case based on lack of standing, the court not only
suggested that a successful direct challenge to Title IX's regulatory
framework was possible, but also provided a glimpse into what such a
challenge might look like. 152
III. RELATION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In this most recent male challenge to Title IX, National Wrestling
Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Department of Education, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia suggested that a constitutional
challenge would be possible with the right group of plaintiffs and a
correctly stated claim.'" The basis of such a claim would be that the
effect of the Policy Interpretation and Clarification is to cause Title IX
to act as an impermissibly inflexible quota system, because there ex-
ists, in effect, only one way to comply. 154
 Because the crux of the ar-
gument is that Title IX is operating as an inflexible quota system, re-
cent affirmative action caselaw provides instruction on the current
U.S. Supreme Court sentiment on the use of quotas in education. 155
The major Supreme Court decisions in this area are Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke and the two recent decisions of Grutter v.
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger 156
lenge educational institutions' conduct under the Regulation (in cutting men's teams),
and they are free to argue in such lawsuits that the statute, its Regulation, the Policy Inter-
pretation, and/or the Policy Clarification are not entitled to deference and should be
struck down as unconstitutional. Id. In stating this final suggestion, the court clarified that
the holding of the Sixth Circuit in Miami University Wrestling Club did not preclude this sort
of action, but rather it required that plaintiffs directly challenge the Regulation and Policy
Interpretation, by way of naming the DOE as a defendant, when they challenge the con-
duct of the institution taken in conformity with those agency policies. Id. (citing Miami
Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 614).
152 See id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this decision that
the plaintiffs lacked standing. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d
930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2537 (2005). In affirming the decision, the
court did not elaborate further on the district court's comments about the potential that
Title IX had been misinterpreted or misconstrued. Sec id.
155 See 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 125 (D.D.C. 2003), affil 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2537 (2005).
154 See id.
155
 See Joseph Z. Fleming, Title IX From The Red Rose Crew to Grutter: The Law and Lit-
erature of Sports, 14 FORDIIAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 793, 793-94 (2004).
155
 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-
71 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
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A. Bakke—A Historical Background
In the landmark 1978 case, Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the use of race in public
higher education admissions)" The Medical School of the University
of California at Davis (the "Medical School") used a special admissions
program to increase the representation of disadvantaged students in
each Medical School class, whereby it reserved sixteen out of 100 seats
in the class for members of certain minority groups, who were subject
to a separate admissions process. 159 The plaintiff, a white male who had
applied for admission at the Medical School in both 1973 and 1974, but
was denied admission in both years, argued that the special admissions
program operated as a racial and ethnic quota in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 159
The Supreme Court issued six separate opinions in the decision,
none of which garnered the support of the majority of the court. 16° Jus-
tice Powell's opinion announcing the judgment, however, has served as
the basis for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions poll-
cies. 191 In his opinion, Justice Powell concluded that race-based policies
such as the Medical School's special admissions process must be subject
to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment)" He then con-
cluded that the attainment of a diverse student body is a constitution-
ally permissible goal for a higher education institution, but that the
Medical School's special admissions program did not constitute a racial
classification that was necessary for the attainment of that goal)"
In reaching that conclusion, Justice Powell pointed to other
higher education institutions that used race as one of a number of
factors considered in the admissions process)" He viewed the
flexibility of such a process as being key to keeping it constitutionally
157 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75 (opinion of Powell, J.).
150 Id. at 272,274-75. This special admissions process consisted of a separate commit-
tee that considered the applications of those who stated they wished to be considered as
members of a "minority group." Id. at 274. These applications were rated, and the special
committee would recommend the special applicants until the faculty-prescribed number
of seats for minority students were filled. Id. at 275.
159 Id. at 276, 278. In 1973, at the time when the plaintiff was rejected, four special ad-
missions slots remained unfilled, but the plaintiff was not considered for any of them. Id
at 276.
160 Gnitter, 539 U.S. at 322-23 (discussing the procedural outcome of the Bakke deci-
sion).
16' Id, at 323.
662 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (opinion of Powell, J.).
165 Sec id. at 311-12,319-20.
164 Id. at 316-18.
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valid. 165 Justice Powell concluded that, though race can be considered
as a factor in the admissions process, the practice of setting aside a
specific percentage of seats in an entering class for minorities—which
in effect tells applicants who are not minorities that they are totally
excluded from those seats—disregards the applicants' individual
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 166
B. Grutter and Gratz: Current Supreme Galin Thinking
Twenty-five years passed after the splintered opinion of Bakke, dur-
ing which time courts and institutions struggled to determine whether
Justice Powell's opinion was binding. 167 Then, in the 2003 case Grutter v.
Bollinger; the U.S. Supreme Court upheld as constitutional the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School (the "Law School") admissions policy,
which required admissions officials to look beyond grades and test
scores to other "soft" variables that included, among other factors, race
and ethnic background. 168 In so doing, the Court expressly endorsed
Justice Powell's view in Bakke that diversity in the student population is
a compelling state interest that justifies the narrowly tailored use of
race classifications in higher education admissions. 166
Key to the Court's determination that the Law School's admis-
sions policy was narrowly tailored and thus constitutional was its
flexibility, which meant that race was considered in a non-mechanical
way. 17° The Court reiterated that to comply with the equal protection
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, universities cannot establish
quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those
groups on separate admissions tracks."' Rather, a higher education
institution can consider race or ethnicity only as a "plus" factor, such
that the institution's admission program remains flexible enough to
ensure race or ethnicity is not the defining feature of students' appli-
cations. 172 Thus, as per this recent Supreme Court decision regarding
the use of race in higher education admissions, the reigning senti-
166 See id. at 317-18.
166 Id. at 319-20.
167 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-26.
166 /d. at 315-16, 343.
166
 Id. at 325.
176
 Id. at 334.
171 See id. The Court defined "quota" as "a program in which a certain fixed number or
proportion of opportunities are 'reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.'" Id. at
335 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989)).
"2 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 336-37.
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ment emphasizes the significance of a flexible approach when using a
suspect class under the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of achiev-
ing a compelling state interest.'"
The U.S. Supreme Court again emphasized the requirement of
flexibility and individualized consideration in the Gratz v. Bollinger de-
cision, which it issued on the same day it issued 0111nel: 174 In Gratz, two
white students who had been denied admission to the University of
Michigan's undergraduate program sued the institution, alleging that
the admissions program violated their equal protection rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.'" The university's admissions office
used a system by which any applicant who was a member of an under-
represented racial or ethnic minority group automatically received
twenty points towards the total number needed for admission.'"
In rejecting this admissions program as unconstitutional, the
Court emphasized that the program was not narrowly tailored be-
cause it did not provide the individualized consideration that the
Constitution required and that Justice Powell contemplated in
Bakke. 177 In particular, the Court emphasized the fact that the admis-
sions process awarded points (and subsequently admission) solely on
the basis of race—without considering other factors.'" This process
did not offer applicants the individualized consideration and selec-
tion process that the Equal Protection Clause required and that the
Supreme Court upheld in Gruttei: 179 The holdings in these affirmative
action cases provide insight into current Supreme Court thinking re-
garding higher education decision making based on class member-
ship—insights that become relevant in the attempt to dissect the cur-
rent operation of Title IX's regulatory framework.' 80
173 See id. at 334.
174 Sec Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268,271-72.
178 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251-52.
178 Id. at 255.
177 Id. at 269-70.
178 Id. at 271-72. Indeed, the only factor that determined the distribution of points was
whether the individual was a member of an underrepresented minority group. Id.
I7g Compare Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 (holding the policy was not sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment), with Gruner, 539 U.S. at 334,337,343 (hold-
ing that the Law School's consideration of race as a "plus' factor retained sufficient
flexibility to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment).
188 See infra notes 181-253 and accompanying text.
850	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 46:825
IV. ANALYSIS: TITLE IX IS OPERATING AS AN IMPERMISSIBLY
INFLEXIBLE QUOTA SYSTEM THAT COURTS
MUST REJECT AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The key to unmasking the true problems with Title IX's current
regulatory framework is in examining the effects of the regulatory
framework's interpretation rather than its structure. 181
 Thus far, the
DOE and the courts have justified the current framework, as inter-
preted, based on its flexibility and its importance as a governmental
objective. 182
 Proper analysis of this framework, however, should look to
how it operates in practice.' 83
 Such an analysis would reveal that the
framework, in fact, operates as an inflexible quota system that forces
education institutions to cut men's teams if they are to remain in com-
pliance with Title IX. 184
 Such an inflexible system is of the type that the
U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected in its relevant affirmative action
decisions, and as such, courts should reject it here as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 185
A. The Flawed Analysis of Cohen
The problems with the current Title IX regime stem from the
1993 First Circuit Court of Appeals' initial flawed interpretation in
Cohen /. 186
 This case was the first challenge of an institution's athletic
programs under Title IX, and it has served as the key decision: virtu-
ally every federal circuit court of appeals subsequently facing a similar
Title IX challenge has followed the First Circuit's analysis of the Regu-
lation and Policy Interpretation. 187
 The First Circuit's analysis was
flawed, however, because (1) it inappropriately granted substantial
deference to the Policy Interpretation, (2) it improperly interpreted
181
 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
182
 See Cohen II, 101 F.3d 155, 170-71 (1st Cir. 1996); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265,
271 (7th Cir. 1994); Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d
82, 113 (D.D.C. 2003), affil, 366 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2537
(2005); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 51.
m See supra notes 113-17; 170-80 and accompanying text.
184 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2002);
Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 2002); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269.
168 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-71 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
188 See Cohen I, 991 F.2d 888, 895-900 (1st Cir. 1993); Connolly & Adelman, supra note
30, at 882.
187 See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 891, 895-900; Lamber, supra note 63, at 169.
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prong three of the three-part test, and (3) it misinterpreted the
proper application of the three-part test as a whole.'"
1. Flaw #1: Improper Deference to the Policy Interpretation
The First Circuit's first error was its decision to grant substantial
deference to the Policy Interpretation) 89 In making this decision, the
court relied on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., which stands for the principle that courts give great deference to
an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is responsible
for administering.'" Under Chevron, however, regulations and their
interpretations should not be given controlling weight if they are "ar-
bitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 191 Indeed,
Chevron indicates that courts should give deference to such interpreta-
tions only if they reflect an agency's reasonable construction of the
statute at issue.'" In addition to this general caution regarding the
granting of deference, the U.S. Supreme Court held more recently in
2000, in Christensen v. Harris County, that substantial deference should
not be accorded to agency interpretations that do not have the force
of law, such as those in opinion letters, policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines.'" In light of the cautions un-
der Chevron and the more recent ruling in Christensen (which the Su-
preme Court issued four years after the Cohen court ruled), strong
arguments exist for questioning the appreciable deference that the
First Circuit—and every subsequent circuit court—granted to the Pol-
icy Interpretation and its three-part test.'"
The First Circuit should not have granted substantial deference
to the Policy Interpretation primarily because of the Policy Interpreta-
tion's inconsistency with Title IX and the Regulation. 198 First, it is un-
clear why the DOE, in its Policy Interpretation, chose to emphasize
the first factor of the ten-factor test over the other nine.'" Indeed, the
agency pulled out the first factor—accommodating the interests and
188 See infra notes 189-225 and accompanying text.
lee See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895.
199 See id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v; Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984)).
191 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
192 Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1046.
193 See id. at 1046 (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
194 See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
'9° See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
196 See Policy Interpretation, supra note 43, at 71,414.
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abilities of male and female students—and then created a separate
three-part test to evaluate compliance with that factor. 197 In the Regu-
lation, however, the DOE set forth the list of ten factors to serve as
guidance in terms of determining compliance with the statute; noth-
ing in the Regulation indicated that institutions, agencies, or courts
should give such substantial weight to the first factor. 198
The Policy Interpretation is also inconsistent with Title IX itself
in its use of substantial proportionality as a means of compliance.'"
Prong one of the three-part test states that compliance with this prong
can be achieved if an institution provides athletic opportunities for
male and female students in proportion to their general respective
enrollments in the institution.2" This use of statistical proportions,
however, is expressly rejected as a means of finding discrimination
under § 1681(b) of the statute. 201 Furthermore, this use of the general
student population for comparison purposes is too simplistic and is
inconsistent with other current discrimination analyses. 202
Indeed, several district courts have called into question the def-
erence afforded the Policy Interpretation with respect to the substan-
tial proportionality prong. 2" The U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana held in its 1996 decision, Pederson v. Louisiana
State University, that the substantial proportionality prong should not
be considered a "safe harbor," because to stop the inquiry at the point
of numerical equality would be inconsistent with the mandate of the
statute. 204 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
1 " Id. at 71,414, 71,417-18.
im See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex, supra note 38, at 24,134, 24,143.
193 See infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
930
 Policy Interpretation, supra note 43, at 71,418.
201 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
202 See Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 862-63. Indeed, it is exactly this sort of
comparison to the general population that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected as
being irrelevant in Title VII employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977). Rather, the Court has held that the appro-
priate comparison group is that of skilled or qualified applicants in the general popula-
tion. Id. The appropriate comparison group in the Title TX athletics context, then, should
be the population of skilled and qualified students in the general population, and the
failure of the agency to use this as the proxy group for the first test renders this prong
questionable at best. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 913-14 (M.D. La.
1996) ("Pederson District "), rev'd, 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
2" See Neal v. Bd. of Trs., No. CV-F-97-5009 REC., 1999 WI.. 1569047, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
1999) ("Neal District "), rev'd, 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Pederson District, 912. F. Supp. at
913-14; Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 832 F. Supp. 237, 242, 243-44 (C.D. III. 1993), relict, 35 F.3d
265 (7th Cir. 1994).
204 912 F. Supp. at 913-14.
2005]	 Unconstitutional Operation of Title 1X's Athletic Provisions	 853
California held in its 1999 decision, Neal v. Board of Trustees, that rely-
ing on proportionality to achieve compliance constituted an imple-
mentation of a quota based on gender, which was a violation of Title
IX. 205 Thus, the fact that courts have expressed concern over the Pol-
icy Interpretation, coupled with the inconsistencies between the Pol-
icy Interpretation and the intent of the Regulation, calls into question
the granting of substantial deference to the Policy Interpretation. 206
2. Flaw #2: Improper Interpretation of Prong Three
The granting of deference was not the only error that the Cohen
court made, however. 247 The First Circuit's second error was its inter-
pretation of the third prong of the test—full and effective accommo-
dation of the interests and abilities of both sexes. 2" The court re-
jected Brown University's contention that an institution can comply
with the third prong by meeting the comparative or "relative" levels of
interest of each sex—that is, by meeting the interests and abilities of
both genders in an equal proportion. 2" Rather, the court interpreted
the standard to require "full and effective accommodation," meaning
that if sufficient interest and ability exists among members of the un-
derrepresented gender that existing programs do not satisfy, then an
institution necessarily will fail prong three of the test.21 °
The court justified the use of this more demanding standard, in
part, because of the perceived difficulty in assessing and quantifying
relative interests and abilities. 2" The standard the court adopted re-
quired a simple inquiry: whether the unmet need of the underrepre-
sented gender is sufficient to require the creation or upgrading of a
team. 212 Brown's proposed standard, by comparison, would have re-
quired inquiry into what would be the appropriate survey popula-
tion—the university, feeder schools, or the regional community—an
inquiry the court thought would overcomplicate this already complex
area of the law. 2n In coining to this conclusion, however, the court
205 1999 WL 1569047, at *3.
206 See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
207 See Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 882-88.
208 Sec id.
2°9 Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 174. Under Brown's reasoning, for example, if a school met
80% of the interests of men on a campus, then it should also meet 80% of the interests of
women on campus. See id.
210 Id. (citing Cohen 1, 991 F.2d at 898-99).
211
 Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900.
212 Id.
419 Id,
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failed to recognize that the agency, in its Policy Interpretation, had
intended institutions and courts to make this sort of relative interest
inquiry. 2 t 4 Indeed, the Policy Interpretation actually provided guid-
ance regarding methods an institution could use to assess the athletic
interests and abilities of its students. 215 Therefore, the First Circuit's
interpretation of the third prong, expressly adopted because of its
simplicity, seems to contradict the agency's intent as reflected in the
Policy In terpretation. 216
3. Flaw #3: Improper Interpretation of the Three-Part Test
The Cohen court's final error was in its interpretation of the
three-part test as a whole. 217 After engaging in an overview of the Title
IX Regulation and Policy Interpretation, the court then engaged in a
further analysis of how these agency documents should work in prac-
tice. 218 First, with respect to the first prong of the test, the court held
that evidence of statistical inequality could be used as evidence of dis-
crimination . 219 The court reached this conclusion despite explicit
language in Title IX stating that it does not mandate statistical equal-
ity between the gender ratio in an institution's general population
and the ratio in the body of student-athletes. 22° Second, the court
went on to hold that even if an institution met the "financial assis-
tance" and "athletic equivalence" standards, it nonetheless could vio-
late Title IX: in other words, failing the controversial three-part test
under the effective accommodations area of compliance necessarily
would equate to noncompliance with Title IX. 221 Not only was this rul-
ing expressly contrary to the language of the Policy Clarification, 222
but it also effectively eliminated factors two through nine of the ten-
214 Sec id.; Policy Interpretation, supra note 43, at 71,417.
215 Policy Interpretation, supra note 43, at 71,417. The DOE actually provides an inves-
tigator's manual to assist with assessing compliance; this manual also provides methods for
ascertaining levels of interest, suggesting the use of surveys and other techniques. See Con-
nolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 865-66.
21e
	 Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 864-67.
217
	
infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
218 See Cohen 991 F.2d at 895-97.
219 Id. at 895.
220 Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 ( b) (2000).
221 See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 897.
222 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. The Policy Clarification specifically stated
that the requirement addressed by the three-part test was but one of many factors consid-
ered in determining compliance. Policy Clarification, supra note 51.
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factor test from consideration during a Title IX compliance inquiry—
a result seemingly inconsistent with agency intent. 225
To summarize, through its "Watershed" analysis in Cohen, the First
Circuit effectively construed Title IX (1) to eliminate factors two
through ten from the relevant inquiry, (2) to interpret the third
prong of the three-part test—accommodation of the interests of the
underrepresented gender—to mean that any unmet interest would
result in violation, (3) to affirm the Policy Interpretation's use of the
general population as the relevant comparison group for purposes of
determining substantial proportionality under prong one, and (4) to
pave the way for substantial deference to a Policy Interpretation filled
with inconsistencies with the original Regulation and the statute. 224
This interpretation of the Title IX statute has continued to survive,
and it is this interpretation, coupled with the realities of modern fiscal
constraints, that has caused Title IX to act as an impermissible gen-
der-based quota system. 225
B. The Effective Elimination of Title IX's Flexibility
In response to charges from male athletes that Title IX, as inter-
preted, acts as an impermissible quota, both the DOE and the courts
have highlighted the inherent flexibility built into the statute for insti-
tutional compliance. 226 Indeed, in defending the substantial propor-
tionality test, both the First Circuit and the DOE in its 1996 Policy
Clarification reiterated that this was but one way to determine
whether an institution's athletics programs comply with Title IX. 227
The proportionality test is considered a starting point, and as the First
Circuit pointed out, the second and third parts of the test are pro-
vided in recognition of the fact that under certain circumstances,
something short of this proportionality is satisfactory for determining
gender balance.228 These arguments in defense of the three-part test,
however, miss the point because the inflexibility has resulted not from
223 See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 897. In the Policy Interpretation, the agency highlights fac-
tors two through ten as factors the DOE should consider in determining whether an insti-
tution is providing equal opportunity in intercollegiate athletics. Policy Interpretation,
supra note 43, at 71,415.
224 See supra notes 186-223 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
226 Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 113; Dear Colleague Letter, supra
note 51; see Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 170-71; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271.
227 Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 171; Policy Clarification, supra note 51.
228 Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 897-98.
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the structure of the three-part test, but, rather, from the application of
the test, 229
 Indeed, the initial interpretation of the test, coupled with
the financial pressures currently confronting educational institutions,
has resulted in a highly inflexible test that leaves institutions with no
choice but to cut men's teams. 230
Though they espouse the built-in flexibility of the test, the courts
also recognize that any effort to cut women's sports teams would leave
an institution in danger of noncompliance with Title IX. 23 ' The second
prong of the three-part test requires institutions to have a history and
continuing practice of increasing athletic opportunities for women. 232
Thus, almost by definition, an institution that cuts women's teams nec-
essarily will fail prong two of the test. 233
 Further, as a result of the Cohen
court's interpretation of prong three, if an institution cuts women's
teams, then, unmet interest in the underrepresented gender is easily
demonstrable, and thus the institution will fail prong three of the
test. 234
 The result is that an institution facing budget constraints is left
with only prong one—substantial proportionality—as a means of com-
plying with Title IX. 235
 Yet this standard is difficult, if not impossible, to
meet. 236
 So, institutions then turn back to prongs two or three, which
leaves them with only one option for achieving the needed budget cuts
while remaining compliant with Title IX: the elimination of men's
teams.237
Thus, this cycle reveals that the structural flexibility of the Title
IX statute essentially has been interpreted away, forcing institutions
either to meet statistical equality with their general populations or to
eliminate only men's teams when faced with budget cuts, 238
 This
inflexible system means institutions eliminate men's teams solely be-
cause of gender and thus operates, in effect, as the type of discrimina-
228 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
23° See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
231 Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269; see Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 171, 174-75, 180; Cohen I, 991 F.2d at
898-900.
232
 Policy Interpretation, supra note 43, at 71,418.
233 Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 874.
234
 See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 898-900.
236 See id.
236 See Connolly & Adelman, supra note 30, at 862-64.
237 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 269.
238
 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 269.
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tory quota system that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected in its
recent affirmative action decisions. 239
C. An Inflexible Quota Is Unconstitutional Under the
U.S. Supreme Court's Affirmative Action Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent rulings on affirmative action in
higher education admissions provide insight to the Title IX discus-
sion. 240 First, in these cases, the Court has held that student body di-
versity is a compelling state interest and thus that the narrowly tai-
lored use of race to achieve this compelling state interest is justified. 241
Second, and more importantly, an institution that wishes to use race
as a criterion in its decision-making process must do so in a "flexible,
non-mechanical" way; only this flexibility allows such a policy to re-
main narrowly tailored enough to be constitutional. 242
 Indeed, in up-
holding the Law School's admission policy in Grutter v. Bollinger; the
Court emphasized the flexibility of the Law School's approach, in
which race and ethnic background were considered a "plus" factor in
the admissions process, but each decision remained highly individ-
ual.243 Likewise, the Court emphasized the non-flexibility of the
schools' approaches when it rejected the admissions policies used in
both Regents of the University of California v. Bakke and Gratz v. Bollin-
ger: 244 In Bakke, the institution used a racial set-aside program whereby
a certain number of seats were reserved for members of minority
groups; in Gratz, the institution automatically granted extra points
that counted toward automatic admission to applicants of particular
racial and ethnic backgrounds. 245 In both decisions, the Court em-
phasized that such broad, inflexible standards were not narrowly tai-
lored, and as such the institutions had violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24°
The Court's analysis in each of these three cases is instructive as
to how courts should view the current operation of the Title IX stat-
ute. 247 Title IX's operation is analogous to that of affirmative action
239 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,334 (2003); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-71.
24° See infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
241 Gruner, 539 U.S. at 325.
242 See id. at 334.
243 Id, at 315-16,334.
244 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell,,].).
245 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Bakke, 438 U.S: at 274-75 (opinion of Powell, J.).
246 See Grace, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
247 See infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
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programs in that, as currently interpreted, it forces universities to
make decisions based on an individual's membership in a particular
group—gender. 248
 Thus, it should follow that the key to withstanding
constitutional scrutiny of such decisions is to emphasize the flexibility
of the system, which can demonstrate that individual rights are not
being curtailed, 249 As discussed above, however, any flexibility that had
been built into the Title IX statute now, in effect, has been inter-
preted out of it, such that an institution facing budget constraints has
no choice but to cut men's teams or be in violation of Title IX. 25°
Though gender-based decisions are subject to the lesser standard of
intermediate scrutiny (as opposed to the strict scrutiny of race-based
decisions), it does not follow that the emphasis on flexibility in the
process should be correspondingly lessened. 251 The appropriate de-
gree of flexibility remains to be determined, but the current lack of
any flexibility at all is certainly not preferable. 252 The decisions being
made tinder Title IX to cut men's teams would not pass constitutional
muster if they were based on race, and the current scheme also
should not pass constitutional muster when the decisions are based
on gender. 253
D. The Future of Title IX: The Need for Federal Circuit Court Action
Guided by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent affirmative action
holdings in Grulter and Gratz, informed by the Court's 2000 Christensen
decision, and enlightened by the substance of the recent male athletic
challenges to the Title IX statute, the federal circuit courts of appeals
should alter their current analysis of Title DC claims and thereby pre-
vent Title IX from continuing down its discriminatory path. 254 Al-
though the First Circuit's 1993 Cohen. I decision was a noble attempt at
defining an appropriate enforcement structure, it was not without
flaws—flaws that recent financial struggles in higher education have
248 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 269.
248 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20
(opinion of Powell, J.).
288 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 269.
°I See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,197 (1976).
452 See supra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
°' See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
734 See infra notes 255-74 and accompanying text.
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exposed.255 The current legal landscape and fiscal realities in higher
education make this a time characterized by new issues that the Cohen
court did not anticipate when it rendered its decision almost fifteen
years ago. 256 It is time for the federal circuit courts of appeals to stop
according judicial deference to the Cohen court's original interpreta-
tion and to reevaluate Title IX's regulatory framework.
The circuit courts first must explicitly recogniie that the Cohen
court's interpretation was flawed, particularly in its granting of sub-
stantial deference to the Policy Interpretation. 257 The legal landscape
with respect to deference to agency interpretations has changed since
Cohen L 256 in particular, the recent Christensen decision—a decision
the Cohen court did not have the luxury to use as guidance—would
counsel against the deference that the First Circuit granted. 259 The
courts should recognize that not only does the Policy Interpretation
not have the force of law and thus it is not entitled to substantial def-
erence under Christensen, but also that careful analysis of the Policy
Interpretation in comparison to the Regulation and the Title IX stat-
ute exposes inconsistencies that even the Chevron standard recognizes
as reasons counseling against deference. 26°
In addition to acknowledging this improper deference to the Pol-
icy Interpretation, the circuit courts also should reevaluate the sub-
stance of male athletes' claims under Title IX and recognize that the
Cohen court's interpretation of the Policy Interpretation's third prong
and of the operation of its entire three-part test was flawed and has
led to an impermissibly inflexible system. 26 i In engaging in this
evaluation, the courts can use reasoning and analysis similar to that
used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Grauer and Gratz.262 In those
affirmative action decisions, the Court demanded that decision mak-
ing based on group classifications (for example, race or gender) be
flexible so as to respect the rights of individuals. 263 The circuit courts
255 See supra notes 189-225 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
259 Sec Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1046 (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
289 See supra notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 240-53 and accompanying text.
285 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20
(opinion of Powell, J.).
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should recognize this demand when analyzing Title IX claims. 264 The
current operation of the regulatory framework results in an inflexible
system whereby universities are forced to make decisions based solely
on gender. 26' The U.S. Supreme Court's affirmative action holdings
reject such inflexible decision making, and guided by those holdings,
circuit courts likewise should reject it here. 266
Having discovered the inflexibility of the current regulatory
framework, the circuit courts must hold the current framework un-
constitutional, 267 Then, the courts should advise the DOE to reexam-
ine and reinterpret Title IX and the Regulation so as to provide a pol-
icy interpretation and accompanying tests that allow for flexibility and
full individual consideration in the decision-making process. 268 Poten-
tial reformulations of the agency's interpretation of the statute could
call for a more balanced inquiry that reinstates examination of the
other nine factors originally set forth in the Regulation. 269 Addition-
ally, a reexamination and perhaps reinterpretation of prongs one and
three of the three-part test also would be advisable. 2"
It is important to note that the ultimate goal of such a reexami-
nation is not to get rid of Title IX.271 Few will deny the positive effects
it has had for female athletes over its more than twenty-five years of
existence. 272 Rather, the DOE must revisit and revise the regulatory
framework in place to enforce the statute so that it operates the way it
was originally intended to operate. 273 In that way, the DOE can pre-
vent discrimination based on sex in a manner that does not hinder
the success of any of this country's student-athletes. 274
264 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37; Gratz, 539 U.S, at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20
(opinion of Powell, J.).
266 See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 611; Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1043; Kelley, 35
F.3d at 269.
266 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
267 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
266 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-72; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
269 See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 199-216 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
272 See, e.g., Brian L. Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst for an Alternative
Model of College Sports, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 351,352-54 (1998); Beveridge, supra note
141, at 810; Ross A. Jurewitz, Comment, Playing at Even Strength: Reforming Title IX Enforce-
ment in Intercollegiate Athletics, 8 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 283,284-86 (2000).
273 See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
274 Sec supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
A close examination of the current operation of the regulatory
framework for Title IX's athletics provisions—a framework that has
resulted from years of circuit court deference to the DOE's Policy In-
terpretation and to the First Circuit Court of Appeals's interpretation
of that document in Cohen u Brown University—reveals an impermissi-
bly inflexible system with which universities must comply. While the
First Circuit's original interpretation of and deference given to the
Policy Interpretation may have been appropriate at the time, subse-
quent caselaw and a change in the nature of the claims under Title IX
reveal the flaws in that original analysis and counsel the circuit courts
to revisit the First Circuit's decisions. In particular, the First Circuit's
holding created a system that operates in an inherently inflexibke
manner, in which the only means for a financially strapped institution
to achieve compliance is to cut men's athletic teams. Such an
inflexible system is counter to the U.S. Supreme Court's current
thinking regarding the use of classifications in higher education deci-
sion making, as seen in the Court's recent affirmative action holdings.
With this in mind, it is time for the circuit courts to alter their analy-
ses of the Title IX regulatory framework, recognize its inherent
inflexibility as unconstitutional, and force the DOE to reinterpret Ti-
tle IX and the Regulation so that Title IX can operate the way it was
originally intended to operate.
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